Competing (Semi)-Selfish Miners in Bitcoin by Marmolejo-Cossío, Francisco J. et al.
Competing (Semi)-Selfish Miners in Bitcoin
Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío?1, Eric Brigham2, Benjamin Sela3, and Jonathan Katz3
1 University of Oxford
francisco.marmolejo@cs.ox.ac.uk
2 New College of Florida
eric.brigham15@ncf.edu
3 University of Maryland
jkatz@cs.umd.edu, benj.sela@gmail.com
Abstract. The Bitcoin protocol prescribes certain behavior by the miners who are respon-
sible for maintaining and extending the underlying blockchain; in particular, miners who
successfully solve a puzzle, and hence can extend the chain by a block, are supposed to
release that block immediately. Eyal and Sirer showed, however, that a selfish miner is in-
centivized to deviate from the protocol and withhold its blocks under certain conditions.
The analysis by Eyal and Sirer, as well as in followup work, considers a single deviating miner
(who may control a large fraction of the hashing power in the network) interacting with a
remaining pool of honest miners. Here, we extend this analysis to the case where there are
multiple (non-colluding) selfish miners. We find that with multiple strategic miners, specific
deviations from honest mining by multiple strategic agents can outperform honest mining,
even if individually miners would not be incentivised to be dishonest. This previous point
effectively renders the Bitcoin protocol to be less secure than previously thought.
Keywords: blockchain, selfish mining
1 Introduction
One of the key innovations in the Nakamoto protocol behind Bitcoin [1] is the assumption that
agents involved in the upkeep of the digital ledger, so called miners, are strategic rather than
adversarial, which invites a game-theoretic analysis of the underlying protocol. Under this relaxed
assumption, Bitcoin enjoys more robust guarantees on its security: the adage being “it is in a
miner’s best interest to be honest when there is an honest majority of miners”.
This adage however was famously proven to be incorrect by Eyal and Sirer [2], when they first
described “Selfish Mining”, a non-honest miner strategy that gives more returns to miners than
honest mining, even if a majority of other agents are honest. Subsequently, there has been much
work exploring the extensions and limitations of selfish mining, but most of this work is limited to
the case in which there is a single selfish miner and the rest of the network acts honestly. In this
paper we study scenarios where more than one miner deviates from the honest mining protocol. We
show that there are substantial game-theoretic differences when multiple miners can be strategic
with implications to Bitcoin’s security. First of all, there are hash rates where a miner is incentivised
to be honest if mining is treated as a one-shot game, yet where the miner is incentivised to be
strategic if he is the leader in sequential (Stackleberg) game. Second of all, we show that with
multiple strategic miners, specific deviations from honest mining by multiple strategic agents can
outperform honest mining, even if individually miners would not be incentivised to be dishonest.
These two previous points effectively render the Bitcoin protocol to be less secure than previously
thought.
1.1 Our Contributions
We study miner incentives when multiple miners employ variants of selfish mining strategies. Orig-
inal selfish mining (SM) consists of secretly withholding mined blocks and judiciously publishing
private blocks in an attempt to increase stale block rates of other miners. Though such an attack
is not immediately profitable, as the block rate of all miners decreases, it can be profitable in a
longer time horizon as block difficulty rates decrease. In SM, miners may keep an arbitrarily long
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private chain, which makes it difficult to analytically solve for relative revenues when more than
one miner employs SM. For this reason, we study a truncation of this strategy, semi-selfish mining
(SSM), where miners keep a private chain of length at most 2.
SSM falls within the family of generalised selfish mining strategies of [3] and [4], and our paper
begins by studying analytic properties of SSM’s performance against honest mining. In Section 4,
we show that although SSM achieves less relative revenue than SM against honest mining, it is
always a more profitable strategy for a strategic miner than honest mining if the miner has a hash
rate larger than 38% of the total system hash rate, and if the strategic miner is able to propagate
blocks to other miners quickly, this threshold lowers to around 26.8%. In fact, we show the relative
revenue of SSM is an asymptotically tight lower bound to the relative revenue of SM as a strategic
miner’s hash power tends to 0.
As mentioned before, the benefit of SSM is that it can be represented with a reduced state
space, and hence we can explicitly solve for relative revenues in the case where multiple strategic
miners employ SSM. In Section 5 we focus on systems with two strategic miners and describe the
Markov chain that governs block publishing dynamics. This allows us to explicitly solve for relative
revenues of all miners in the steady state.
With the steady state solutions in hand, we are able to study the incentives that govern the
decision whether a miner uses SSM against another strategic miner. To do so, we define a binary
action two-player game amongst both strategic miners which we call the SSM game. In the SSM
game both miners are denoted by m1 and m2 and they have corresponding utility functions U1
and U2. In addition, each miner has the action set {H,S} representing honest mining and SSM
mining. Interestingly, we find multiple scenarios at different hash rates:
– For all pure strategy profiles, s ∈ {(H,H), (S,H), (H,S), (S, S)}, there exist hash rates of both
strategic miners such that s is a unique pure Nash equilibrium.
– When both strategic miners have roughly around 0.2 to 0.27 of the system’s hash power, both
(H,H) and (S, S) are simultaneously pure Nash equilibria of the SSM game.
– There exist hash rates where a specific miner is not unilaterally incentivised to employ SSM,
yet (S, S) is the only pure Nash equilibrium of the game. This effectively lowers the minimum
hash rate required for SSM to be profitable by virtue of the existence of another strategic
miner.
– There exist hash rates where U1(S, S) < U1(H,H) < U1(S,H) (once again, an identical result
holds with the roles of miners reversed). This is interesting because although SSM is individually
rational for the first strategic miner, the second (larger) strategic miner has the ability to
“penalise” the first miner were they to retaliate by using SSM.
We also consider a richer action space for miners: we allow them to partition their hash power
into an honest portion and an SSM portion. The game specified by these utilities is called the
partition game, and when treated as a one-shot game, it yields the same pure Nash equilibria
as the SSM game. The more interesting result stems from treating this game as a Stackelberg
game and understanding optimal commitments a miner may make to elicit a desired behaviour in
the other miner. It turns out that in the partition game, there exist hash rates with non-trivial
Stackelberg equilibria that can result in large gains for leader miners. In fact, there are even hash
rates where a miner is honest in the one-shot SSM game, yet strategic in the sequential partition
game’s Stackelberg equilibrium. This has important consequences for the security of Bitcoin, as
miners with smaller hash rates than what was known before may be incentivised to be strategic in
a sequential setting.
In Section 7 we consider the scenario where M > 2 miners are strategic. For 1 ≤ M ≤ 8, we
compute bounds on the minimal α ∈ [0, 1] such that if the M strategic miners each with hash
power α have to decide between employing honest mining and SSM, the strategy profile where
all such miners employ SSM Pareto-dominates honest mining. For each M , we call α the uniform
profitability threshold for SSM, and we show that not only is it a decreasing function in M , but
that already for M = 8, α is as low as 0.11. This is striking, because at such hash rates, miners
are far from being individually incentivised to employ SSM, implying that the existence of other
strategic miners can effectively hurt the stability of Bitcoin.
As an aside, we also note that in Appendix C we explicitly extend our game-theoretic formalism
from Section 5 and Section 6 to the multi-player setting, and we specify how to compute utilities
in these games. Furthermore, in Appendix D we extensively map incentives of 3 strategic miners
akin to Section 5 and Section 6. We find that the game-theoretic observations of the two-player
setting generalise appropriately.
1.2 Related Work
Selfish mining was originally introduced by Eyal and Sirer in [2]. In this work, the authors describe
Selfish Mining (SM), a specific mining strategy that deviates from the prescribed honest mining
strategy of the Bitcoin network with the key property that it is more profitable than honest mining
for miners with over 1/3 of the hash power of the entire Bitcoin network. Subsequently, [4] and
[3] identify a generalised class of selfish mining strategies to which SM belongs and show that in
general there are more aggressive and profitable strategies than SM within this family of strategies.
In a similar vein, [5] uses game theory to formalise the decision a single strategic miner may take
to employ different strategies from the generalised family of selfish mining strategies. In particular,
they define analogous complete information games to real-life mining and show that for these
games, if no miner has a large enough hash power, honest mining is a Nash equilibrium.
Perhaps most similar to our work is [6], where the authors simulate multiple strategic miners
employing strategies other than honest mining. Their results are simulation-based, whereas we
provide closed-form results for the specific SSM strategy. In fact, our model can be seen as a
variant of the model used in [7], which we developed concurrently to allow for an arbitrary number
of strategic agents employing SSM. Furthermore we focus on the game-theoretic considerations
miners may take in deciding whether to employ SSM in varying degrees.
Subversive mining strategies can also be combined with network level attacks to exacerbate
undue profits. This is discussed in [4] where the authors combine selfish mining strategies with
eclipse attacks; an eclipse attack is when an entity holds all connections with a subset of the
mining swarm and can thus control all communication between them and the rest of the miners.
The authors show that no combination of a selfish mining strategy and eclipse attack is optimal
at all times. The choice of what selfish mining strategy to adopt as well as how to eclipse a
victim is highly dependent on the network parameters in which one is operating. These parameters
include computational power, percentage of the network that can be eclipsed, and the percentage
of remaining miners that can be influenced.
There are additional attacks miners can wage outside the family of selfish mining. At the pool
level, managers can wage withholding attacks as per [8] [9], where a malicious pool infiltrates a
victim pool, submitting shares and withholding full solutions. Indeed this notion of “partitioning”
one’s pool is similar to our partition games from section 5. [9] shows that this can be profitable for
a single malicious pool, but when multiple pools engage in block withholding attacks, this results
in a situation akin to the prisoner’s dilemma, where the equilibrium of all malicious pools is to
infiltrate and thus reduce the overall profit of every pool in the network. Withholding attacks are
further refined in [10], where a malicious pool still withholds full solutions from a victim pool, but
may share said full solutions when it hears of a full solution being found by a miner outside of the
malicious and victim pool. The intent of this strategy is to incentivise the victim pool manager
to cause a fork, and this behaviour does away with the prisoner’s dilemma of [9], as there are
equilibria where larger pools are strictly better off than honest mining. Furthermore, there is some
evidence showing that this family of pool-level attacks can be difficult to detect for victim pools
[8].
Along with work covering subversive mining attacks and which strategies miners should adopt
based on network parameters, there have also been efforts to defeat these attacks. In [11] the authors
outline a new blockchain protocol, Bitcoin Next Generation, which decouples leader election and
transaction serialization for better scalability. In addition to this they also modify which chain
honest miners adopt as the one they will mine on. Currently, when honest miners are presented
with two chains of the same length, they will opt to accept the older one. This fact gives selfish
miners an advantage in that they become more powerful the more connected they are to the rest of
the network and can lower the necessary computational power needed to selfish mine successfully.
In their new protocol, they propose that when an honest miner is presented with two chains of
the same length, they choose which one to mine on uniformly at random. With this change, the
lower bound on computational power needed to selfish mine increases, thus making it harder to
act subversively. While this was conjectured to be true and showed to be so with simulation, there
are contradictory results. In [12] the authors show that while this change does limit the strength of
large selfish miners, it enhances the strength of medium sized selfish miners and that selfish miners
with computational power less than 25% can still gain from acting subversively.
2 Model Assumptions and Notation
The decentralised design of Bitcoin consists of clients: users of Bitcoin, who own accounts desig-
nated by addresses. A client can send Bitcoin from an address he owns to an arbitrary address
by broadcasting a transaction to the Bitcoin P2P network. This transaction will eventually be
appended to a a global ledger called the Blockchain. The upkeep of the Blockchain is performed
by miners, who collect transactions in blocks and append these blocks to the chain. For this task,
miners are rewarded with Bitcoin, either in the form of a block reward or transaction fees.
We model the Blockchain system as a set of M strategic miners, m1, ...,mM , and an implicit
honest miner mM+1. Each strategic miner mi, controls an αi ∈ (0, 0.5] portion of the system hash
power (we don’t consider strategic miners strong enough to perform a 51 percent attack), and the
honest miner mM+1 controls a β = 1−
∑M
i=1 αi > 0 portion of the system hash power. The implicit
honest miner is without loss of generality for if any number of miners (beyond the strategic miners
m1, ...,mM ) employ honest mining, this is equivalent to one miner of their combined hash power
employing honest mining. For convenience we denote the set of valid strategic miner hash rates by
HM = {α ∈ (0, 0.5]M | ∑Mi=1 αi < 1}.
Given strategic miner hash rates α ∈ HM , any found block has an αi probability of being found
by the i-th strategic miner mi, and a β probability of being found by mM+1. We also assume that
the system overall finds blocks at a rate of λ according to a Poisson process. In terms of the actual
implementation of the Bitcoin protocol, λ is roughly one block every 10 minutes, which is ensured
by dynamically adjusting the difficulty of the block hash target.
The append-only nature of the block renders the Blockchain into a tree with a root at the genesis
block. Since the longest path of the tree is the agreed-upon transaction history, a miner’s revenue
consists of his block rewards and transaction fees arising from blocks that eventually become a part
of the longest path in the Blockchain. In this paper we focus on block rewards and normalise such
rewards to unit value, hence the revenue of a miner is the number of his blocks that are accepted
in the longest path of the blockchain.
Indeed it could be the case that a longest path in the blockchain is eventually surpassed by a
competing path: this is a key aspect to selfish mining strategies. This of course makes it difficult
to ascertain revenues when miners are arbitrary agents. In our paper however we pit specific
mining strategies against each other and hence obtain a well-defined block creation rates for all
agents involved. Furthermore, we assume that agents are rational and that the utility they wish
to maximise is their relative revenue: which is for a miner mi is the expected number of blocks
mi publishes in the blockchain normalised by the expected number of blocks produced by all
minersm1, ...,mM+1. The justification behind this utility function comes from the fact that Bitcoin
dynamically adjusts its difficulty, hence relative revenue in the long-term corresponds to overall
revenue.
3 Miner Strategies
Mining strategies are often defined with an implicit assumption that a miner following the strategy
will be pitted against miners employing a specific strategy (i.e. honest mining). Since our paper
focuses on miner incentives when multiple miners deviate from honest mining, we find ourselves in
need of rigorously defining miner strategies with respect to all possible changes in the blockchain,
not just those changes that can occur against a specific kind of miner.
In this vein, we formally describe three specific mining strategies: honest mining, selfish mining,
and semi-selfish mining. We describe the strategies for an arbitrary miner denoted by m.
To execute these strategies, m must keep track of their private chains, the public chain, a block
upon which to mine and an internal state ` ∈ {0, 0′} ∪N. As for additional notation, priv denotes
the private chain of m, pub denotes the public chain and F (frontier) denotes the set of blocks at
the ends of the longest paths of the public chain. Arbitrary blocks are usually denoted by B. We
also let len(priv) and len(pub) denote the length of the longest path in the miner’s private chain
and the length of the longest path of the public chain respectively. For a given set of a blocks S,
we let oldest(S) denote the oldest block in S of which m was aware. Finally, we let end(priv) be
the block at the end of the miner’s private chain and p(m) be the block upon which m is mining.
The integer of the internal state, ` represents a miner’s “lead”: how much longer the miner’s
private chain is than the public chain. For all three mining strategies states 0 and 0’ will not only
mean that the miner has no lead with respect to the public chain, but that the miner’s private
chain is in fact the public chain (a fact which follows from the rules governing the strategies).
Finally, the difference between 0 and 0’ is that the latter state occurs when there is a tie on the
public chain, i.e. |F | > 1. The choices available to miners are where to mine, p(m), and whether
to reveal parts of their private chain.
3.1 Honest Mining
Honest miners are those who follow the prescribed Bitcoin mining protocol faithfully. We describe
the strategy in terms of what actions m takes when in states ` ∈ {0, 0′}:
– Case 1: m finds a block, B.
• m publishes B.
• `← 0.
• p(m)← B.
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′.
• If |F ′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′).
It is straightforward to check that if all miners mine honestly, their expected relative revenue is
precisely their hash rate:
Lemma 1. For any α ∈ HM , if all strategic miners are honest, the expected (block) reward of any
strategic miner mi is αi (and β for the extra honest miner mM ).
3.2 Selfish Mining
Eyal and Sirer introduced Selfish Mining (SM) in [9] as a specific strategy that outperforms honest
mining when a rational agent has sufficient computational resources. SM can be described by the
actions m takes in the following states:
` = 0 and p(m) = oldest(F )
– Case 1: m finds a block: B.
• m keeps B private.
• `← 1.
• p(m)← B.
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′
• If |F ′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′)
` = 0′ and p(m) = oldest(F )
– Case 1: m finds a block: B.
• m publishes B.
• `← 0.
• p(m)← B
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′.
• If |F ′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′)
` ≥ 1 and p(m) = end(priv)
– Case 1: m finds a block: B.
• m keeps B private.
• `← `+ 1.
• p(m)← B.
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′ and k = len(pub′)− len(pub) ≤ max(`− 2, 0).
• m publishes k-prefix of priv.
• `← `− k.
• p(m)← p(m).
– Case 3: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′ and k = len(pub′)− len(pub) > max(`− 2, 0).
• m publishes priv, resulting in pub′′ with frontier F ′′
• If |F ′′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′′).
At a glance, this characterisation of SM may look different to how it is usually described. Upon
closer inspection however, one can see that this is equivalent to what was presented in [9]. In
particular, the fact that in state ` = 0′, p(m) = oldest(F ), means that when a tie involves a block
mined by m (as would be the case if they had published a previously private block), they will
indeed continue mining upon it, as they will have necessarily seen it first amongst blocks in F .
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Fig. 1. SM Dynamics. A square with M is a block mined by m. The circle with m represents the value
of p(m). A solid line means that portion of the chain is public, and a dashed line means that portion of
the chain is private. If a miner employing SM has a lead of ` = 1 that is diminished, he publishes his
private chain and hopes to win the tie (Top). If the miner has a larger lead that is partially encroached, he
publishes a prefix of his private chain to push other miners into a race (Middle). If a miner of lead ` > 1
sees his lead encroached to ` = 1, he publishes all blocks to overtake (Bottom).
3.3 Semi-Selfish Mining
SM can be generalised to a class of strategies where a miner maintains a private chain and has the
following actions at hand: publishing a portion of his private chain, mining upon his private chain,
and foregoing his private chain to mine upon the public chain. Indeed, this general class of selfish
mining strategies is studied in [13] and [3].
We focus on the simplest selfish mining strategies from this family by looking at strategies
where the selfish miner never maintains a private chain of length greater than 2. Notice that this
is necessary if the selfish miner is to gain any benefit from selfish mining, for if the miner only
maintains at most one private block, he can only hurt his chances of having this block (and hence
any block) published when facing honest miners. On the other hand, for private chains of length 2,
we exhibit a specific strategy Semi-Selfish Mining (SSM) that much like the original SM strategy,
leads to increased revenue ratios for the selfish miner if they have sufficient hash power.
The reason we study such a simple strategy from the rich space of selfish mining strategies is
that it still obtains higher relative revenues than honest mining in certain parameter regimes, yet
it has a much simpler state space than most selfish mining strategies. This reduced state space will
eventually allow us to explicitly solve for expected relative revenues when two selfish miners play
against each other. SSM can be described by the actions m takes in the following states:
` = 0 and p(m) = oldest(F )
– Case 1: m finds a block: B.
• m keeps B private.
• `← 1.
• p(m)← B.
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′
• If |F ′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′)
` = 0′ and p(m) = oldest(F )
– Case 1: m finds a block: B.
• m publishes B.
• `← 0.
• p(m)← B
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′.
• If |F ′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′)
` = 1 and p(m) = end(priv)
– Case 1: m finds a block: B.
• m keeps B private.
• `← 2.
• p(m)← B.
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′ and k = len(pub′)− len(pub) = 0.
• m does nothing.
– Case 3: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′ and k = len(pub′)− len(pub) > 0.
• m publishes priv, resulting in pub′′ with frontier F ′′
• If |F ′′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′′).
` = 2 and p(m) = end(priv)
– Case 1: m finds a block: B.
• m publishes oldest(priv \ pub).
• `← 2.
• p(m)← B.
– Case 2: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′ and k = len(pub′)− len(pub) = 0.
• m does nothing.
– Case 3: pub changes to pub′ with frontier F ′ and k = len(pub′)− len(pub) > 0.
• m publishes priv, resulting in pub′′ with frontier F ′′
• If |F ′′| = 1, then `← 0.
• If |F ′′| > 1, then `← 0′.
• p(m)← oldest(F ′′).
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Fig. 2. SSM as a truncation of SM. Once again, a square with M is a block mined by m. The circle with
m represents the value of p(m). A solid line means that portion of the chain is public, and a dashed line
means that portion of the chain is private. Here m has a lead of ` = 2 and upon mining a block, publishes
his oldest private block.
4 One Strategic Miner
We begin by studying how one strategic miner of hash power α ∈ H1 = (0, 0.5] performs against
honest miners of hash power β = 1 − α in terms of relative revenue. As in [9], we let γ be the
proportion of honest miners who mine upon an SSM chain in the case of a tie, a parameter which
we call the propagation of the strategic miner. In what follows, we let rSM and rSSM be the
expected block creation rate of a single miner using SM and SSM respectively against honest
miners. Consequently, we let rothers be the block creation of other honest miners in the system
(this is dependant upon whether SM or SSM is used, but we use the same term for the sake of
simplicity). Finally, we let RSM and RSSM denote the relative revenues of a single miner using
SM and SSM respectively against honest miners.
Theorem 1 (Selfish Mining Relative Revenue [9]). A single strategic miner of hash power
α and propagation γ, attains the following revenue ratio using SM against honest miners:
RSM =
rSM
rSM + rothers
=
α(1− α)2(4α+ γ(1− 2α))− α3
1− α(1 + (2− α)α)
Asymptotically around α = 0 the expression is the following:
RSM = αγ + α
2(4− 3γ) + α3(4γ − 5) + α4(7− 5γ) + α5(6γ − 7) +O(α6)
We can use similar Markov chain methods to derive the revenue ratio of SSM against honest
miners. The details of the analysis can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. A strategic miner of hash power α and propagation γ, attains the following revenue
ratio when using SSM against honest miners:
RSSM =
rSSM
rSSM + rothers
=
α(α(α(2α− 5) + 4)− (α− 1)3γ)
(α− 1)α2 + 1
Asymptotically around α = 0, the expression is the following:
RSSM = αγ + α
2(4− 3γ) + α3(4γ − 5)− α4(6− 5γ) + α5(7γ − 9) +O(α6)
4.1 Comparing Performance of SM and SSM
Asymptotically SM and SSM have the same performance as α→ 0. In fact RSM −RSSM = O(α4).
For all parameter settings SM outperforms SSM, as evidenced in the graphs in Figure 3. At γ = 0
SM becomes profitable at α = 1/3 and SSM becomes profitable at α = 0.38. At γ = 0.25 SM
becomes profitable at α = 0.3 and SSM becomes profitable at α = 1/3. Finally, at γ = 0.5 SM
becomes profitable at α = 1/4 and SSM becomes profitable at α = 0.26795
Fig. 3. RSM and RSSM against honest miners at γ = 0, 0.25 and 0.5
5 Two Strategic Miners
The benefit of SSM lies in the fact that it can be a rational strategy distinct from honest mining
and more importantly, describing it in terms of a Markov chain does not require many states. The
simplicity of the state space allows us to explore the scenario where two agents of different hash
rates employ SSM and analytically solve for relative revenues.
5.1 Markov Chain Analysis
Suppose that α = (α1, α2) ∈ H2 is the strategic hash rate of the system. Since we have two
strategic miners, our state space, S, consists of nine states of the form Si,j where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 2.
These represent the relative lead SSM miners 1 and 2 have with respect to the public chain. Given
our description of SSM we can describe the state transitions in the same way as we did for the
single SSM case. Both of these can be found in Appendix B.
5.2 Transition Matrix and Steady State
The above state space gives rise to an ergodic Markov chain, so there is a unique stationary dis-
tribution we can solve for. In order to do so, we define the following transition matrix, P , on
R9, where the coordinate axes of R9 (in ascending order) represent probability mass in states
S0,0, S0,1, S1,0, S0,2, S1,1, S2,0, S1,2, S2,1, and S2,2 respectively. Each Px,y is the probability of tran-
sitioning to state x from state y in the Markov chain.
P =

β β β β β β α2(1− α2) + β α1(1− α1) + β 1
α2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
α1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 α2 0 α2 0 0 α
2
2 0 0
0 α1 α2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 α1 0 0 α1 0 α
2
1 0
0 0 0 α1 α2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 α1 α2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 α1 α2 0

Since this is an ergodic chain, there is a unique steady state distribution, pi, such that Ppi = pi,
which we can solve for with Gaussian elimination.
5.3 Propagation and Revenues
In the original selfish mining paper, much attention was given to the propagation parameter γ.
Indeed block dissemination is important because it allows an attacker to persuade other miners to
work on their chain in the case of a tie. We also note from the previous section that the steady state
distribution pi is independent of the propagation of the system. The expected number of blocks
published per state however, crucially depends on the propagation of the system, and these two
objects specify the relative revenue of agents.
In our work, when there is a single strategic miner employing SSM, the ability to propogate
blocks is parametrised by γ as in the original analysis of SM. When there are strategic miners
employing SSM however, how propagation is modelled becomes more complicated, since different
strategic miners may have a different influence on the P2P network topology. For the rest of the
paper we assume that propagation is uniform. In other words, whenever there is a tie in the
public chain (of arbitrary size), all miners not involved in the tie are assumed to have a uniformly
random chance of contributing their hash power to any element of the tie. Under the assumption
of uniform propagation, we can compute the expected block rate per state of the Markov chain
for both strategic miners and honest miners. The following matrix R encodes this information: the
first and second row are expected block rates per state for the first and second strategic miners
respectively, the third column is the block creation rate for honest miners. If pi is a steady state
vector for M above, then RTpi ∈ R3 gives steady state expected block creation rates for all miners.
R =

0 0 β
βα1 2βα2 +
1
2β(1− α2) 12βα1 + 32β2
2βα1 +
1
2β(1− α1) βα2 12βα2 + 32β2
0 α2 + 2β 0
2βα1 +
1
3β
2 2βα2 +
1
3β
2 4
3β
2
α1 + 2β 0 0
0 2β + 2α22 + 3α2(1− α2) 0
2β + 2α21 + 3α1(1− α1) 0 0
3α1 + 3βα1 +
1
2β
2 3α2 + 3βα2 +
1
2β
2 β2

For the sake of completeness, in Appendix B we include a model for different propagation rates
when two strategic miners are involved as well as their effects on relative revenues of all miners.
5.4 To SSM or not to SSM? A Revenue Analysis
Although our Markov chain analysis gives us a closed-form solution for the relative revenue of both
strategic miners when using SSM, the expression is unwieldy. We can however explicitly solve the
expression for specific hash values, α1 and α2 and use these values to describe a two-player, binary
action game governing the decision as to whether a player employs SSM or not.
Suppose that α = (α1, α2) ∈ H2 describes the hash rates of both strategic miners. We let
RSSM (α) = RSSM ((α1, α2)) ∈ [0, 1]3 be the revenue ratios of all miners (including the honest
miner m3) when both strategic miners employ SSM. Specifically, RSSM (α)i is the revenue ratio of
mi for i = 1, 2, 3. With this in place we can define a two-player binary action game governing the
incentives behind employing SSM or not for m1 and m2.
Definition 1 (Two-player SSM Games). Suppose that α = (α1, α2) ∈ H2 is a strategic hash
distribution. We define the SSM Game, Gα as a two-player binary action game. In Gα each strategic
miner has a binary action set {H,S} ∼= {0, 1}, where H ∼= 0 represents mining honestly and S ∼= 1
represents employing SSM. We define the utilities of all pure strategy profiles as follows:
– U1(H,H) = α1, U2(H,H) = α2
– U1(H,S) = α11−α2RSSM ((0, α2))3, U2(H,S) = RSSM ((0, α2))2
– U1(S,H) = RSSM ((α1, 0))1, U2(S,H) = α21−α1RSSM ((α1, 0))3
– U1(S, S) = RSSM (α)1, U2(S, S) = RSSM (α)2
For notational convenience, we interchangeably denote a pure strategy profile of all players by either
a tuple, as in (H,H) for both miners employing honest mining, or a string, as in HH
As a first region of interest, in Figure 4 we display hash rates where U1(S, S) < U1(H,H) <
U1(S,H). For such α, although SSM may be unilaterally rational for the first strategic miner,
a larger miner can penalise the first strategic miner for deviating from the honest protocol by
retaliating with SSM. As a specific example of this phenomenon, let us consider the hash distribu-
tion α = (0.33, 0.48) which leads to Gα with utilities summarised in Table 1. The second, larger,
strategic miner m2 can retaliate from SH by deviating to SS, in which case m1 is worse off by
approximately 0.04 in utility than if he had mined honestly at the outset.
Table 1. Example of Gα where m2 can retaliate against SH
α = (0.33, 0.48) HH HS SH SS
U1 0.33 0.26794954 0.35517387 0.29387121
U2 0.48 0.57777649 0.46196499 0.61890781
Fig. 4. Hash rates where U1(S, S) < U1(H,H) < U1(S,H) and subsequent penalty values given by
U1(S, S)− U1(H,H).
Now that we have defined the game Gα, it is natural to ask about what equilibria it has. Our
results suggest that for all values of α ∈ H2, Gα has at least one pure Nash equilibrium (PNE),
so that if we let PNE(G) denote the PNE of a given game G, PNE(Gα) 6= ∅ for α ∈ H2. In
the first image of Figure 5 we show which regions of H2 demonstrate different combinations of
PNE. For the most part, hash rates lead to a single PNE in Gα, with distinct regions where each
pure strategy profile (HH,HS, SH, and SS) occurs as a sole equilibrium. The most interesting
observation however, is that for α roughly in the region [0.2, 0.27]2, PNE(Gα) = {HH and SS}.
For all of these hash rates, SS Pareto dominates HH as it results in more utility for both agents
involved. As a concrete example, consider Gα for α = (0.24, 0.24) with utilities in Table 2. Clearly
HH and SS are PNE in Gα, and the utility surplus between SS and HH is approximately 0.02
for m1 and m2.
Table 2. Example of Gα with HH and SS as PNE
α = (0.24, 0.24) HH HS SH SS
U1 0.24 0.24293956 0.23069139 0.25911617
U2 0.24 0.23069139 0.24293956 0.25911617
The second image in Figure 5 focuses on [0.2, 0.27]2 ⊂ H2 and visualises the difference in utility
between SS andHH form1. The difference in utility form2 is symmetric since Gα is an anonymous
game, meaning the role m1 and m2 can be interchanged.
Fig. 5. PNE types and the welfare surplus of SS over HH for m1 when both are PNE.
Interestingly, there are hash rates α ∈ H2 where SS is an equilibrium, yet SH is not profitable
relative to HH for m1. This means that the existence of another strategic miner can make mining
with SSM profitable and stable for m1 whereas this is not the case when m1 with hash power α1
is the only strategic miner in the system. For these α we say the profitability threshold of SSM
has decreased. The set of α ∈ H2 such that the profitability threshold of SSM decreases is graphed
in Figure 6. Furthermore, there are hash rates in this region where SS is the only PNE, such as
α = (0.235, 0.345) which leads to Gα with utilities in Table 3.
Table 3. Example Gα where SSM Profitability Threshold Decreases
α = (0.235, 0.345) HH HS SH SS
U1 0.235 0.22352621 0.22418585 0.23160125
U2 0.345 0.37698013 0.34987697 0.42917647
Fig. 6. Hash rates where the profitability threshold of SSM is reduced.
The logical next step is to ask about mixed Nash equilibria in Gα, however the meaning of
mixed strategies is not well-suited for selfish mining attacks. For example, what would the mixed
strategy 0.2H + 0.8S represent? One interpretation could be a randomised commitment, where
with probability 0.2 a miner commits to H and with probability 0.8 a miner commits to SSM.
This however does not make much sense for selfish mining attacks, since their profitability takes
time (due to adjustments in the block difficulty of the system), meaning that an opposing agent
would have ample time to perform a best response to the realised commitment over the initial
randomisation.
Another approach is to have 0.2H + 0.8S mean that a miner partitions his hash power into
honest mining and SSM mining and commits to this partition henceforth. Although utilities of
mixed strategies do not directly correspond to convex combinations of utilities, we use this approach
to study an extended action space for miners.
6 Partition Games and Strong Stackelberg Equilibria
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, we also study incentives when miners are given a
richer set of pure strategies beyond that of choosing between honest mining and SSM. In particular,
we now allow a given miner with hash power αi to partition his computational power into a portion
following SSM and a portion using honest mining. Before continuing we also clarify notation: for
x, y ∈ Rn, we use x ◦ y to denote the Hadamard product of x and y.
Definition 2 (Two-player Partition Games). Suppose that α = (α1, α2) ∈ H2 is a strategic
hash distribution. We define the Partition Game, GPα , as a two-player game, where each player has
the same action set [0, 1], representing the proportion of their hash power dedicated to employing
SSM. For a given pure strategy profile s = (s1, s2) ∈ [0, 1]2, we define the utilities of GPα as follows:
– U1(s1, s2) = s1RSSM (s ◦ α)1 + (1− s1) (1−s1)α11−s·α RSSM (s ◦ α)3
– U2(s1, s2) = s2RSSM (s ◦ α)2 + (1− s2) (1−s2)α21−s·α RSSM (s ◦ α)3
In Figure 7, for α = (0.46, 0.25) we graph the pure strategy utilities of m1 and m2 as a function
of s ∈ [0, 1]2. The most glaring observation is that for fixed s−i, Ui(si, s−i) is a convex function of
si, attaining local maxima at si = 0 and si = 1. This is clear from the fact that the blockchain
eventually has one common history, so both sides of a miner’s partition inherently compete with
one another.
Fig. 7. Utilities in GPα for α = (0.46, 0.25).
Game theoretically, this means best responses for any mi are always from the set {0, 1}. Im-
mediately, this tells us that the set of pure Nash equilibria of GPα are the same as those in Gα,
since GPα restricted to pure strategy profiles in {0, 1}2 is isomorphic to Gα (recall that H ∼= 0 and
S ∼= 1 in Gα). It may thus seem the augmented strategy space of GPα buys us nothing, however if
we treat GPα as a leadership game, where m1 gets to commit to a pure strategy, s1, to which m2
retaliates, then we get a different story.
To formally treat GPα as a leadership game, we let m1 be the leader and m2 the follower.
For a given pure strategy s1 ∈ [0, 1] of m1, we let BR(s1) denote the best response m2 has
to s1. Since we have observed that best responses for any mi are always from the set {0, 1}, it
follows that BR(s1) = argmaxx∈{0,1}U2(s1, x). If U2(s1, 0) = U2(s1, 1), then we let BR(s1) =
argmaxx∈{0,1}U1(s1, x), so that m2 breaks ties in favour of m1. The value of commitment s1 for
m1 is denoted by v1(s1) = U1(s1, BR(s1)) and for the value of commitment s1 for miner 2 is
denoted by v2(s1) = U2(s1, BR(s1)).
In a leadership game, a common solution concept is that of a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
(SSE), which is a strategy pair (s∗1, s∗2) such that s∗1 ∈ argmaxxv1(x) and s∗2 = BR(s∗1). This can be
seen as a subgame perfect equilibrium of GPα , or the optimal commitment under v1. Furthermore,
we let SSE(G) denote the SSE of an arbitrary game G.
In Figure 8 we graph (optimal) commitment values for m1 at the SSE of GPα for different values
of α ∈ H2. Furthermore, we graph the value of these optimal commitments when compared to
utility players obtain at their respectively optimal PNE of Gα at the given hash rate.
6.1 Non-trivial SSE
Since GPα can be seen as an augmented action space to Gα, we categorise α ∈ H2 depending on
how the sets PNE(Gα) = PNE(GPα ) and SSE(GPα ) compare.
Definition 3 (Commitment/SSE Types). For every α ∈ H2 we associate a commitment type
denoted com(α) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} defined as follows:
– If SSE(GPα ) = PNE(Gα), then com(α) = 0.
– If SSE(GPα ) ⊂ PNE(Gα), then com(α) = 1.
– If SSE(GPα ) 6⊂ PNE(Gα), and ∃s∗ ∈ SSE(GPα ) such that s∗1 ∈ {0, 1}, then com(α) = 2.
– If SSE(GPα ) 6⊂ PNE(Gα), and 6 ∃s∗ ∈ SSE(GPα ) such that s∗1 ∈ {0, 1}, then com(α) = 3.
If com(α) = 0 we say α ∈ H2 gives rise to a trivial commitment and that the collection of SSE
in GPα are trivial. Accordingly, if com(α) 6= 0, we say α gives rise to a non-trivial commitment and
the collection of SSE in GPα is non-trivial. Furthermore, we also say that if α ∈ H2 is such that
com(α) = i, then all s∗ ∈ SSE(GPα ) are of type i as well. In the two-miner scenario, we make the
following observations about α ∈ H2 with non-trivial commitment types:
– com(α) = 1 occurs at hash values such that the PNE of Gα are HH and SS. m1 commits to
S to nudge the system to converge to the SS equilibrium which Pareto-dominates HH in Gα.
– com(α) = 2 occurs at hash rates where there is one SSE of GPα , s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ {0, 1}2, yet s∗
does not correspond to a PNE of Gα. s∗ is unstable in Gα from the perspective of m1, who
would prefer deviating from s1 when pitted against s2. These SSE make use of the sequentiality
of GPα but not of the extended action space given by partitioning.
– com(α) = 3 occurs at hash rates such that HS is the only PNE of Gα, but where α is close
to the region in H2 where SS arises as the sole PNE of Gα. At these values, m2 only slightly
prefers SH to SS, hence m1 can bait m2 into playing S by reserving a small portion of hash
power to mine honestly.
For any non-trivial SSE, v1(s∗1) is lower bounded by the lowest-utility m1 obtains amongst PNE
in Gα. On the other hand, if com(α) = 1, 3, the SSE of GPα are such that v1(s∗1) is strictly greater
than the highest utility m1 obtains amongst PNE in Gα. This strict surplus in utility is visible in
the latter graphs of Figure 8, and we can see that these non-trivial commitments also benefit m2
in spite of being the follower.
6.2 Plots of Non-Trivial SSE by Type
We now focus on plotting optimal H2 that exhibit SSE of types 1, 2 and 3. For SSE of type 1, it
suffices to look at Figure 5 and Table 2 for visualisation of the benefit of SSE over PNE (Since it
is just the difference in welfare between PNE in this case).
As for SSE of type 2, these are plotted in more detail in Figure 9. For these values of α, we
can see that HH is the only PNE in Gα, but SS is the SSE of GPα , which is forcibly unstable in
the one shot game, Gα, as m1 prefers HS to SS. Table 4 shows the utilities for Gα at a specific
value of α exhibiting this behaviour. Note that in this example, the leader, m1, has a hash rate
of α1 = 0.2, at which normally they would not be incentivised to unilaterally employ SSM in the
one-shot SSM game. The power to commit makes SSM viable at smaller hash rates than in the
one-shot game.
Fig. 8. SSE types for m1, optimal commitments for m1, and relative surplus of SSE against best PNE for
m1 and for m2 respectively.
Table 4. Example Gα where the SSE in GPα is of type 2
α = (0.2, 0.225) HH HS SH SS
U1 0.2 0.20352746 0.18016529 0.20179681
U2 0.225 0.21133109 0.23057851 0.23905979
Figure 10 focuses on hash rates where SSE are of type 3. Furthermore, Figure 11 looks specif-
ically at α = (0.431, 0.239), which is a hash rate such that GPα has an SSE of type 3, and graphs
utilities and best responses as a function of the leader commitment in GPα . This gives a better way
of visualising how s1 = 0.98 is an optimal commitment where m2 is rendered indifferent between
S and H.
7 M > 2 Strategic Miners
Our analysis from Section 5 extends in a straightforward fashion to when there areM > 2 strategic
miners. Consequently, for any hash distribution α ∈ HM , we can compute RSSM (α) ∈ [0, 1]M+1,
the revenue ratio of all M strategic miners and all other honest miners, when all strategic miners
of hash power αi employ SSM. The full details of the corresponding Markov chain and reward
vectors can be found in Appendix B.
It is also straightforward to extend the game-theoretic formalism of Section 5 to study incentives
when M > 2 strategic miners interact. This formalism can also be found in Appendix C. In
Appendix D we also plot similar graphs to Section 5 for M = 3 at different hash rates to visualise
strategic miner behaviour. When M > 3 however, it becomes difficult to visualise how aspects of
Gα and GPα precisely vary with α. That being said, we do find very similar structures as in the
M = 2 and M = 3 case, such as: penalising coalitions, existence of PNE, and for some regions
multiple PNE, in Gα, non trivial commitments in GPα , and finally, hash rates α where the SSM
profitability threshold decreases with the existence of other strategic miners. We expand upon
this final point to specifically see how the number of strategic miners M affects the profitability
threshold of SSM.
Fig. 9. Optimal Commitments for m1, as well as SSE surplus against best PNE for m1, and for m2
respectively in the region [0.185, 0.2]× [0.21, 0.27]. This region exhibits SSE of type 2.
Fig. 10. Optimal Commitments for m1, as well as SSE surplus against best PNE for m1, and for m2
respectively in the region [0.2, 0.5]× [0.19, 0.28]. This region exhibits SSE of type 2.
Fig. 11. Partition Game Analysis for α = (0.431, 0.239). The top left image plots follower utilities when
playing H or S against a leader commitment partition. The bottom left image plots follower utility when
best responding to a leader commitment. The best response at a given commitment dictates which of the
two utilities the leader obtains in the top right plot. Putting everything together, the bottom right plot
gives the value of a leader commitment (for the leader) as a function of their commitment. Note how this
function is maximised at approximately 0.98, where the follower is indifferent between H and S.
7.1 Decreasing SSM Profitability Threshold
To study the effect of the number of miners on the profitability threshold of SSM, we define the
following:
Definition 4 (Uniform Profitability Threshold for SSM). For M ≥ 1 miners we say the
uniform profitability threshold for SSM is the smallest η ∈ [0, 1] such that α = η1 ∈ HM and
1 ∈ PNE(Gα) (all players employing SSM is a PNE in Gα).
With our methods from Appendix C, we can approximate the uniform SSM profitability thresh-
old for various values of M . In particular, Figure 12 shows these threshold values for M = 1, ..., 8.
Furthermore, the second plot takes the uniform SSM profitability threshold, η, and for α = η1,
computes the utilities of both 0 and 1 which are both PNE in Gα. Interestingly, forM = 1, .., 8, not
only does the uniform profitability threshold decrease as a function ofM , but all miners employing
SSM is a PNE that Pareto dominates all miners being honest. These results thus show that the
presence of multiple strategic miners may have more of an impact on the stability of Bitcoin than
previously thought.
Fig. 12. Upper bounds on the uniform profitability threshold for SSM as a function of the number of
strategic miners. We also plot the welfare of 1 (all SSM) versus 0 (all honest).
8 Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper we have described a specific miner strategy, semi-selfish mining (SSM) that is a
truncated variant of Selfish Mining (SM). SSM has the benefit of being a profitable strategy for
large enough miners (in the same way as SM), and also structured enough for us to explicitly solve
for relative revenues when more than one strategic miner employs SSM. With this in hand, we
have been able to use a game-theoretic lense to glean some information on miner incentives when
more than one miner is strategic within the bitocin system.
In particular, for any α ∈ HM , we define the SSM game Gα which governs strategic miner
incentives in choosing to employ SSM or mine honestly, and the partition game GPα , which extends
the action space of Gα to allow miners to partition their hash power between honest mining and
SSM. ForM > 1 strategic miners we find the following main takeaways from studying Gα and GPα :
– All α ∈ HM seem to lead to Gα with pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore, there are regions in
HM such that Gα has multiple PNE.
– A single miner might prefer to use SSM over honest mining in Gα, but there can exist a
coalition of miners who may retaliate against this action and punish the original SSM miner
into receiving less utility than their hash power.
– Though the set of PNE in GPα is identical to those of Gα, when treating GPα as a sequential
game leads to non-trivial commitments, some of which involve a miner employing SSM even
though SSM is not rational in the one-shot SSM game.
– Finally, there exist hash rates, α ∈ HM such that m1 does not unilaterally prefer to employ
SSM, but some PNE of Gα includes m1 employing SSM, effectively reducing the profitability
threshold of SSM and consequently affecting the stability of Bitcoin.
The action spaces in Gα and GPα may seem limited due to the fact that they only interpolate
between honest mining and SSM, but there is nothing barring a variant Gα and GPα from studying
the choice of employing other subversive mining strategies over honest mining. In fact, Gα and GPα
can be defined by using empirical estimates to steady state payoffs instead of closed form solutions,
which could glean some information into how mining dynamics change when a larger palette of
subversive strategies is available to interdependent strategic miners. In fact, GPα could be extended
so that the action space of miners is no longer simply partitioning mining power between honest
mining and SSM, but any partition of mining power amongst a given list of subversive mining
strategies.
In addition, the fact that penalising coalitions exist hints at the possibility of modelling such
structures in a repeated game framework. The issue of course comes in modelling how much
utility a penalising coalition gains in maintaining everyone honest, but there could be interesting
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in an appropriate model. Finally, along the same vein of penalising
coalitions, there is also scope for a more fine-grained cooperative game theoretic analysis of SSM
and Partition games.
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A SSM vs. Honest Mining
We can use a similar Markov chain analysis to derive the revenue ratio of SSM against honest
miners. We recall that the strategic miner, m1, has hash power α ∈ H1 = (0, 0.5] and the honest
miner m2 has hash power β = 1− α. Let us define the state space S = {S0, S1, S2} corresponding
to the number of private blocks belonging to the miner employing SSM. We can now describe the
transitions and their corresponding revenues (expected block creation rate per state):
Transitions from state S0
– S0 → S0 occurs if m2 find a block. The probability of this transition is β and m2 wins a block.
– S0 → S1 occurs if m1 finds a block. The probability of this transition is α and no players win
a block.
Transitions from state S1
– S1 → S0 occurs if m2 finds and publishes a block, which occurs with probability β. A fork
is created when m1 subsequently publishes his hidden block and from here three events can
occur: A first scenario occurs when m1 finds another block to resolve the tie in his favour,
resulting in two blocks for m1. This occurs with probability α. A second scenario occurs when
an honest miner finds a block that resolves the tie in favour of m1, resulting in one block for
m1 and one block for m2. This occurs with probability γβ. A final scenario occurs when an
honest miner finds a block that resolves the tie in favour of m2 which results in two blocks
for m2. This final event occurs with probability (1 − γ)β. In all aforementioned scenarios the
resulting state is S0, thus the probability of the transition to state S0 is β.
– S1 → S2 occurs if m1 finds a block and keeps it private as per SSM. This event occurs with
probability α and no blocks are awarded to any agent.
Transitions from state S2
– S2 → S0 occurs when m2 finds a block. The probability of this transition is β and m1 wins
two blocks.
– S2 → S2 occurs if m1 finds a block. The probability of this transition is α and m1 wins a block.
The transitions are visualised in Figure 13. Furthermore, we can fully express the transition
matrix of the Markov chain as follows:
M =
1− α 1− α 1− αα 0 0
0 α α

For a given probability distribution x ∈ R3 over the state space S, Mx gives the resulting prob-
ability distribution over S after one transition under the Markov chain above. Since the chain is
easily seen to be ergodic, there exists a unique steady state distribution, pi, such that Mpi = pi.
S0 S1 S2
α
1− α
α
1− α
1− α
α
Fig. 13. States and Transitions for SSM vs. Honest Miners
Using Gaussian elimination we obtain pi = (1− α, α(1− α), α2)T as the unique steady state. Fur-
thermore, from the transitions mentioned above we obtain the following expected block creation
rates (denoted by rSSM and rothers) per state:
Table 5. Expected revenue per state
State E(rSSM | Si) E(rothers | Si)
S0 0 1− α
S1 (1− α)(γ(1− α) + 2α) (1− α)(γ(1− α) + 2(1− α)(1− γ))
S2 α+ 2(1− α) 0
We let rSSM and rothers denote the expected revenue per round at steady state pi for m1 and
m2. We also let RSSM and Rothers denote the revenue ratios of m1 and m2 at steady state. Given
our expected revenues per state, we obtain rSSM = (2− γ)α4 + (3γ − 5)α3 + (4− 3γ)α2 + γα and
rothers = (1− α)2
(
(γ − 2)α2 + (2− γ)α+ 1).
Theorem 3. A strategic miner of hash power α attains the following revenue ratio when playing
against honest miners:
RSSM =
rSSM
rSSM + rothers
=
α(α(α(2α− 5) + 4)− (α− 1)3γ)
(α− 1)α2 + 1
Asymptotically around α = 0, the expression is the following:
RSSM = αγ + α
2(4− 3γ) + α3(4γ − 5)− α4(6− 5γ) + α5(7γ − 9) +O(α6)
B Markov Chain Formalism for M ≥ 2 Strategic Miners and Arbitrary
Propagation
In this section we delve into the Markov chain governing revenues (block creation rates) when
multiple strategic miners employ SSM. In what follows we assume that α ∈ HM . This implies that
m1, ...,mM are strategic miners with hash power α1, ..., αm, and mM+1 is an honest miner with
hash power β = 1−∑Mi=1 αi.
As in the one miner case, we let S = {0, 1, 2}M be the state space of all possible private leads
held by m1, ...,mM employing SSM. For a given x ∈ S, xi denotes the private lead of mi. In
addition, for a given x ∈ S, we let Ax = {i ∈ [M ] | xi = 1} and Bx = {i ∈ [M ] | xi = 2}. Clearly
Ax ∩ Bx = ∅, furthermore, we can completely establish transition probabilities from x by looking
at Ax and Bx.
B.1 State Transitions
Let us suppose x ∈ S is arbitrary. In what follows we let ei ∈ {0, 1}M be the unit vector with 1
in the i-th coordinate. Furthermore, we let Px→y denote the probability of transitioning from x to
y. To fully describe all transitions for any x ∈ S, we look at four different cases depending on Ax
and Bx.
|Ax| ≥ 0, |Bx| = 0 If any strategic miner mi obtains a block, they keep it private as per SSM
extending their private chain by 1 (which they forcibly have a margin to do so). This results in
state x + ei and occurs with probability αi. If mM+1 finds a block, they publish it as per the
honest mining protocol, which occurs with probability β. All mi such that xi 6= 0 then publish
their private chains as per SSM and a race ensues. The conditions of SSM and honest mining
dictate that the race is settled in the following turn, and hence we return to state 0. In summary:
– Px→x+ei = αi for all i ≤M
– Px→0 = β
|Ax| = 0, Bx = {j} In this case a single miner has a private lead of 2 and all other miners
have no private lead. If any strategic miner mi such that i 6= j finds a block, SSM dictates that
they keep this block private and proceed to having a private chain of length 1. This corresponds to
transitioning from x to x+ ei, which occurs with probability αi. If the mj finds a block, an event
which happens with probability αj , SSM dictates he publish his oldest private block. Since Ax = ∅,
this block will be the longest public chain, and the resulting state will be x again. Finally, if mM+1
finds a block, honest mining dictates he publish it. mj in turn sees his private lead decrease to 1
and hence publishes his entire private chain. As a consequence state 0 ensues, and this transition
occurs with probability β. In summary we have the following transitions:
– Px→x+ei = αi for all i 6= j
– Px→x = αj
– Px→0 = β
|Ax| ≥ 0, |Bx| > 1 Suppose thatmi such that i /∈ Bx finds a block, which occurs with probability
αi. As per SSM mi has a margin to keep this block private, hence state x+ei ensues. On the other
hand, if mi is such that i ∈ Bx, then by SSM, mi publishes their oldest private block. As a result,
all miners in Ax publish their private leads to start a race, and all miners in Bx publish their
private leads to overtake. mi thus sees his private lead diminish to 1, hence by SSM he publishes
his entire private chain. This chain is the longest of all miners, hence we return to state 0. Finally,
if mM+1 finds a block, which occurs with prability β, he publishes it as per honest mining, all
strategic miners with hidden chains once again publish their hidden chains. There is a multi-way
race amongst all miners in Bx, but as per SSM and honest mining, this race is decided in the
following turn and we return to state 0. In summary we have the following transitions:
– Px→x+ei = αi for i /∈ Bx
– Px→0 = β +
∑
i∈Bx αi
|Ax| > 1, Bx = {j} If any mi such that i 6= j finds a block, an event which occurs with
probability αi, then SSM dictates they keep this block private and the resulting state is x+ ei. If
mM+1 finds a block, which occurs with probability β, they publish it as per honest mining, and mj
sees his lead diminished and by the rules of SSM, publishes his private chain to create the longest
public chain. The resulting state is thus 0. Finally, if mj finds the following block, he publishes his
oldest private block as per SSM, and consequently the public tie is amongst a prefix of the chain
of mj the chains of all mi such that i ∈ Ax, since they also publish their private chains. At this
point mj is mining upon his private chain whereas all other miners, including mM+1 mine upon
some of the chains partaking in the public tie. From here there are two scenarios. Either mj also
finds the following block, in which case SSM dictates he publish it, and the new public prefix of
his chain is the longest public chain and the ensuing state is 2ej , or any miner other than mj finds
the next block, in which case mj sees his lead diminished and publishies his entire private chain
resulting in state 0. The overall probability of the first scenario is α22 and the overall probability
of the second scenario is α2(1− α2). In summary we have the following transitions:
– Px→x+ei = αi for i 6= j
– Px→2ej = α2j
– Px→0 = β + αj(1− αj)
B.2 Propagation Formalism
In the original analysis of selfish mining, much attention was given to a data propagation parameter
γ. Propagation is important because it allows an attacker to persuade honest miners to work on
their end the public chain when forks occur.
When there areM ≥ 2 strategic miners however, propagation intricacies cannot be captured by
a single parameter, as different strategic agents have different abilities to convinces other miners
of their own chains. To encompass this generality, let us suppose that D ⊆ [M + 1] is a subset
of miners engaged in a tie (we recall that mM+1 is the implicit honest miner in the system). For
j ∈ D and i ∈ [M +1] we let γDi,j be the probability that mi mines upon the chain of mj in the tie
composed of all D miners. The only restriction we place on these parameters is that γDi,i = 1 for
i 6= M + 1. The reason for this is that a strategic miner will mine upon their public chain in case
of a tie. Finally, we note that in the uniform propagation model we use throughout the paper, we
simply let γDi,j =
1
|D| if i /∈ D and i 6= j or if M + 1 ∈ D and i = j =M + 1.
B.3 Expected Revenue per State with Arbitrary Propagation
For a given state x ∈ S, we compute the expected revenue per agent under the underlying Markov
chain governing SSM dynamics. We denote this quantity by rev(x) ∈ RM+1, where rev(x)i denotes
the expected revenue of mi when the system is in state x ∈ S.
In order to compute these quantities, it will be useful to define the expected revenue all agents
obtain when there is an arbitrary tie involving a set D ⊆ [M ] of miners. As we have seen in state
transitions, for a given x ∈ S, ties can involve either agents with a private lead of 1 or agents
with a private lead of 2. We denote the expected revenue all agents receive when a tie of D ⊆ [M ]
miners with private lead of i = 1, 2 occurs by Ti(D) ∈ RM+1:
– T1(D) =
∑M+1
i=1 αi
(∑
j∈D γ
D
i,j(ei + ej)
)
– T2(D) =
∑M+1
i=1 αi
(∑
j∈D γ
D
i,j(ei + 2ej)
)
As with state transitions, for a given x ∈ S, we can characterise rev(x) by looking at Ax and
Bx, the indices of strategic miners with a private lead of 1 and 2 respectively.
|Ax| = |Bx| = 0 In this case, only mM+1 revceives a block if he finds one, which occurs with
probability β.
– rev(x) = βeM+1
|Ax| > 0, |Bx| = 0 In this case, blocks are only won in the event of a tie, which in turn only
happens if mM+1 originally finds a block with probability β. In such a case, there is a tie amongst
the indices Ax ∪ {M + 1}.
– rev(x) = β ((T1(Ax ∪ {M + 1}))
|Ax| = 0, Bx = mj In this case, if mj finds a block, he publishes his oldest block as per SSM
and thus wins a block in the turn. If mM+1 finds and publishes a block as per honest mining, mj
publishes his entire chain as per SSM and wins two blocks in the turn.
– rev(x) = αj(ej) + β(2ej)
|Ax| ≥ 0, |Bx| > 1 If any mj such that j ∈ Bx finds a block, by SSM they publish their oldest
private block. Other miners with indices in Bx thus publish their entire private chains of length
2, and consequently mj publishes his entire private chain of length 2 (relative to the original fork
so still longer than all other private chains), winning 3 blocks overall. If any mi such that i /∈ Bx
finds a block, they simply keep it private as per SSM and no blocks are definitively won. Finally, if
mM+1 finds a block with probability β, then all mj such that j ∈ Bx publish their private chains
and a tie ensues amongst these agents, which results in T2(Bx) expected revenue for all miners.
– rev(x) =
∑
j∈B αj(3ej) + βT2(Bx)
|Ax| > 1, Bx = mj If mM+1 finds a block with probability β, mj sees his lead diminished and
publishes his entire private chain, thus winning two blocks. If anymi such that i /∈ Bx finds a block,
they simply keep it private as per SSM and no one immediately wins blocks. Finally, if mj finds
two blocks in a row he publishes a prefix of his private chain and wins two blocks (transitioning to
state 2ej in the process). If mj finds a block (thus leading him to publish his oldest private block
as per SSM), and subsequently any other miner finds the next one, mj sees his lead diminished
and publishes his entire private chain, winning 3 blocks overall.
– β(2ej) + α2j (2ej) + αj(1− αj)(3ej)
C Game Theoretic Formalism for M > 2 Strategic Miners
Our analysis from Section 5 extends in a straightforward fashion to when there areM > 2 strategic
miners. Consequently, for any hash distribution α ∈ HM , we can compute RSSM (α) ∈ [0, 1]M+1,
the revenue ratio of all M strategic miners and all other honest miners, when all strategic miners
of hash power αi employ SSM. The full details of the corresponding Markov chain and reward
vectors can be found in Appendix B. In this section, we extend the game-theoretic formalism of
Section 5 to to study incentives when M > 2 strategic miners interact.
C.1 To SSM or not to SSM in the Multiplayer Setting
We recall that Section 5 introduced SSM games, a family of binary action games Gα that governed
the incentives behind choosing to employ SSM or honest mining. We extend this game to the
multiplayer setting in a natural way. Suppose that α ∈ HM is a hash rate of all strategic miners.
Once again, we let RSSM (α) ∈ [0, 1]M+1 be the revenue ratios of all miners. Just as before,
RSSM (α)i is the relative revenue of mi.
Definition 5 (Multi-player SSM Games). For every α ∈ HM , we define the SSM Game, Gα
as a M -player binary action game. Each strategic miner has a binary action set {H,S}, where H
represents mining honestly and S represents employing SSM. For convenience, we associate this
action space with {0, 1}M , where action 0 denotes honest mining and action 1 denotes employing
SSM. In order to specify utilities, we suppose that x ∈ {0, 1}M is a pure action profile such that
xi = 1 and xj = 0:
– Ui(x) = RSSM (α ◦ x)i
– Uj(x) =
αj
1−α·xRSSM (α ◦ x)M+1
Penalising Coalitions In Section 5 we explored scenarios where an agent might be unilaterally
incentivised to use SSM, but a second larger agent can retaliate by employing SSM to make the
original agent worse off than when everyone mines honestly. In the multiplayer setting, any subset
of agents can retaliate in a similar fashion, thus we formally define what constitutes a penalising
coalition. In what follows, we use the notation χC ∈ {0, 1}M to denote an indicator vector for a
subset C ⊂ [M ].
Definition 6 (Penalising Coalition). Suppose that α ∈ HM is a distribution of hash power
amongst M strategic miners. We say that C ⊂ {2, ...,M} is a penalising coalition for miner 1 if
the following hold:
– U1(χ1) > U1(0)
– Ui(χ1∪C) > Ui(χ1∪C\i) for all i ∈ C
– U1(χ1∪C) < U1(0)
Furthermore, we say that C incurs a penalty of U1(0)− U1(χ1∪C) on miner 1 when retaliating
The first condition ensures that miner 1 has a unilateral incentive to deviate and employ SSM.
The second condition ensures that each miner in the penalising coalition is better off retaliating
than defecting from the retaliation (ensuring retaliation is in a loose sense a credible threat), and
finally the third condition ensures that miner 1 is worse off when being retaliated against than
when everyone is honest.
C.2 Partition Games in the Multiplayer Setting
In Section 6, we introduced the notion of a partition game, GPα , which extended the action space
of Gα to allow miners to partition their hash power into honest mining and employing SSM. This
definition extends naturally to the M -player case.
Definition 7 (Multi-player Partition Games). Suppose that α ∈ HM is a hash distribution
for M strategic miners. We define the Partition Game, GPα , as a M -player game, where each
player has the same action set [0, 1], representing the proportion of their hash power dedicated to
employing SSM. For a given pure strategy profile s ∈ [0, 1]M , we define the utility of the i-th player
in GPα as follows:
– Ui(s) = siRSSM (s ◦ α)i + (1− si) αi(1−si)1−∑αisiRSSM (s ◦ α)M+1
Optimal Commitments in GPα As in the M = 2 miner case, for any miner i, every action
si ∈ (0, 1) is dominated by either si = 0 or si = 1 if GPα is treated as a one shot game. The reason
for this is that partitioning hash power results in unnecessary self competition, hence it will never
be a best response to fixed opponent strategies. Consequently, the PNE of GPα as a one shot game
are identical to the PNE of Gα.
On the other hand, we can once again treat GPα as a full information sequential game where
m1 commits to a strategy and all other M − 1 players react. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria
(SGPNE) of this game are generalisations of the Stackelberg equilbria of Section 6. The most
subtle issue with generalising SSE however arises in tie-breaking. The assumption in SSE for two
player games is that the follower will break ties in favour of the leader. This is a fair assumtion
in the two-player setting, because it is often the case that commitments that lead to indifference
in responses are of lower measure than those that invoke unique best responses. For this reason
a leader can commit to strategies in an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of an SSE to ellicit the
desired best response in the case of a tie for the follower.
In the multi-player setting however, it can be the case that a non-trivial neighbourhood of
leader commitments give rise to subgames with multiple PNE. For this reason it may be unfeasible
to assume that follower agents converge to a PNE that maximises the welfare of the leader, as
there is nothing in the power of the leader to even approximately guarantee this behaviour. For
this reason, we take a pessimistic approach to SGPNE of GPα . In particular, we assume that
for a leader commitment, all other agents will settle on a PNE that minimises welfare for the
leader. To be precise, for a given pure strategy s1 ∈ [0, 1], we let GPα (s1,−) denote the (M − 1)-
player subgame for miners 2, ...,M conditioned on miner 1 committing to s1. Furthermore, we let
WSN(s1) (Worst sub-Nash) be the lowest utility pure Nash equilibrium of GPα (s1,−) for miner 1.
The value of commitment s1 in the leadership game GPα for miner 1 is v1(s1) = U1(s1,WSN(s1)),
and for any other miner i = 2, ...,M , vi(s1) = Ui(s1,WSN(s1)). We call the family of all such
pure strategy profile the collection of Pessimistic Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria, (P-SGPNE).
In particular, we are interested in values of α where the set of P-SGPNE of GPα result in strictly
larger welfare for m1, implying that either the possiblity of commitment or partitioining strictly
benefits m1 in the worst case.
In a similar fashion to the two-player case, we study how different values of α ∈ HM give rise
to different P-SGPNE(GPα ) vs PNE(Gα) = PNE(GPα ).
Definition 8 (Multiplayer Commitment/ SGPNE Types). Suppose that α ∈ HM , we clas-
sify its commitment type, com(α), depending on the relationship between the sets P-SGPNE(GPα )
and PNE(Gα)
– If P-SGPNE(GPα ) = PNE(Gα), then com(α) = 0.
– If P-SGPNE(GPα ) ⊂ PNE(Gα), then com(α) = 1.
– If P-SGPNE(GPα ) 6⊂ PNE(Gα) and ∃s∗ ∈ P-SGPNE such that s∗1 ∈ {0, 1}, then com(α) = 2
– If P-SGPNE(GPα ) 6⊂ PNE(Gα) and 6 ∃s∗ ∈ P-SGPNE such that s∗1 ∈ {0, 1}, then com(α) = 3.
As in the two-player case, if com(α) = 0 we say α ∈ HM gives rise to a trivial commitment and
that the collection of P-SGPNE in GPα are trivial. Accordingly, if com(α) 6= 0, we say α gives rise
to a non-trivial commitment and the collection of P-SGPNE in GPα is non-trivial. Furthermore, we
also say that if α ∈ HM is such that com(α) = i, then all s∗ ∈ P-SGPNE(GPα ) are of type i as well.
D Results for M = 3 Miners
In order to visualise results forM = 3miners, we fix the hash rate of the third player, α3 and repeat
our analysis for Section 5 when α1 and α2 are allowed to vary. We observe qualitative difference in
the family of games Gα for four different regions of α3 values: R1 = [0, 0.17], R2 = [0.175, 0.203],
R3 = [0.208, 0.27] and R4 = [0.274, 0.5].
D.1 Pure Nash Equilibria in Gα
As mentioned in the previous section, our results show four main regimes of results as a function
of α3. In terms of PNE, When α3 ∈ R1, H strictly dominates S for miner 3, hence the three player
games Gα and GPα reduce to a two player game conditioned on player 3 playing H. For α3 ∈ R2,
we see the emergence of SSS as a PNE near the centre of the hash space, and the size of this
region grows as a function of α3. For α3 ∈ R3, SSS is still a PNE for central values of α, however
we see the emergence of distinct regions where SHS and HSS are PNE. Finally, when α3 ∈ R4,
S strictly dominates H for player 3, and once again Gα and GPα reduce to subgames conditioned
on miner 3 playing S.
In Figure 14, we visualise this phenomenon by picking representative values of α3 in R1, R2, R3
and R4 and graphing regions where distinct PNE occur in Gα as well as the difference in welfare
between the best and worst PNE for each player respectively.
Fig. 14. PNE for α3 ∈ {0.14, 0.2, 0.22, 0.36}. For the areas that have multiple PNE, the difference in
welfare at the best PNE and worst PNE for miner 1 and miner 3 are mapped in the second and third rows
respectively. Since Gα is an anonymous game, the difference in welfare for miner 2 is the same as that of
miner 1 reflected about the axis y = x.
D.2 SSM Profitability Threshold Diminished
As in the two-player case, we find that there are hash rates wherem1 is not unilaterally incentivised
to employ SSM, yet there exist equilibria where m1 employs SSM. In Figure 15 we visualise the
hash rates where this happens for all Ri relevant regions of α3 values. In particular, for α3 values in
R2, R3 and R4, we see that the emergence of SSS as a PNE can occur when m1 has much smaller
hash power than the 0.26795 necessary to make SSM profitable unilaterally.
Fig. 15. Profitability Threshold Diminished for α3 ∈ {0.14, 0.2, 0.22, 0.36}
D.3 Optimal Commitments
As mentioned in Section C, we treat GPα as a full information sequential game where m1 commits
to a strategy and all other miners subsequently act. We recall that for a given pure strategy
commitment s1 ∈ [0, 1] for m1, the worst Nash equilibrium of the resulting subgame Gα(s1,−)
for m1 (so in terms of U1) is denoted by WSN(s1). In addition, vi(s1) = Ui(s1,WSN(s1)) for
i = 1, ...,M , denotes the utility obtained by each miner at (s1,WSN(s1)).
For α3 ∈ R1, R2, R3, R4, we look at what values of s1 optimise v1(s1) as optimal commitments
from the leader of GPα , m1. As mentioned in Section C, any s∗ = (s∗1,WSN(s∗1)) that optimises v1
is necessarily a (pessimistic) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In Figure 16 we plot these optimal
commitments with fixed α3 as a function of (α1, α2). Furthermore, we also plot com(α) as per
Definition 8, and the subsequent surplus between v1 at the aforementioned pessimistic SGPNE
and the worst lowest utility PNE for m1. Similar observations can be made as in the two-player
case of Section 6:
– When com(α) = 0, pessimistic SGPNE of GPα are identical to PNE of Gα, so the ability to
partition and the ability to commit to strategies do not give m1 an undue advantage in the
worst case.
– When com(α) = 1 it is generally the case that Gα has multiple PNE, and the commitment of
m1 “nudges” other players to a PNE that Pareto-dominates the worst PNE in Gα.
– The only exception to the previous observation is the left-most region of com(α) = 1 when
α3 = 0.2 is fixed (second column of Figure 16). In this area, the optimal commitment for m1
is s1 = 0. In response to this, the subgame Gα(0,−) only has HH as a PNE. As a consquence,
the only pessimistic SGPNE at these α values is (0, 0, 0), yet both (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1) are
PNE in Gα. The reason for this however, is that if we consider the commitment s1 = 1 (i.e.
m1 employing SSM), then Gα(1,−) actually has two PNE: HH and SS. The worst of these
two equilibria however is HH, and thus the strategy profile (1,WSN(1)) = (1, 0, 0), which is
strictly worse than (0, 0, 0) fpr m1.
– When com(α) = 2 there exist pessimistic SGPNE, s∗ = (s∗1,WSN(s∗1)) /∈ PNE(Gα) such that
s1 ∈ {0, 1} and s∗1 is not a best response to WSN(s∗1) for m1.These non-trivial commitments
make use of sequentiality of GPα but not of the augmented action space granted by partitioning.
– When com(α) = 3, m1 has enough hash power that PNE(Gα) only has strategy profiles that
exemplify m2 and m3 being disincentivised to use SSM. That being said, at these values of
α, m2 and m3 are almost indifferent between employing SSM and honest mining (hence the
reason com(α) = 3 occurs along boundaries of where PNE(Gα) changes values), hence m1 can
bait them into employing SSM by judiciously giving away some hash power to honest mining
in a partition.
D.4 Penalising Coalitions
In Figure 17 we plot hash rates where there exist penalising coalitions against miner 1 along with
the smallest given penalty they can incur on miner 1. Furthermore, in the top row of the plot,
we specify precisely which coalitions C ⊂ [2, 3] satisfy the conditions of Definition 6. The plots
show that for α3 ∈ {0.14, 0.36} there is only one kind of penalising coalition (C = {2} or C = {3}
respectively), but for α3 ∈ {0.2, 0.22}, C = {2}, {3} and {2, 3} are all penalising coalitions at
different hash rates and for some values of α.
Fig. 16. Optimal m1 commitment for α3 ∈ {0.14, 0.2, 0.22, 0.36}, commitment types, and utility surplus
in P-SGPNE vs. worst PNE for m1.
Fig. 17. All Penalising Coalitions for miner 1 when α3 ∈ {0.14, 0.2, 0.22, 0.36}, and the smallest penalty
they incur.
